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ABSTRACT: According to Vasubandhu’s Trisvabhāvanirdeśa or Treatise on the Three 
Natures, experiential phenomena can be understood in terms of three natures: the 
constructed (parikalpita), the dependent (paratantra), and the consummate (pariniṣpanna). 
This paper will examine internalist and anti-internalist or non-dualist interpretations of the 
Yogācāra theory of the three natures of experience. The internalist interpretation is based on 
representationalist theory of experience wherein the contents of experience are logically 
independent of their cause and various interconnected cognitive processes continually create 
an integrated internal world-model that is transparent to the cognitive system that creates 
and uses it. In contrast, the anti-internalist interpretation begins, not from the constructed 
nature of experiential objects, but from the perfected nature of mind-world non-duality. This 
interpretation treats the distinctions between inside and outside, subject and object, mind and 
world as distinctions drawn within experience rather than between experience and something 
else. And experience here refers to the continuous dynamic interplay of factors constituting 
our sentient embodied (nāma-rūpa) existence. Having examined each interpretation, the 
paper will suggest some reasons to favor the non-dualist view. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According to Vasubandhu’s Trisvabhāvanirdeśa or Treatise on the Three Natures, 
experiential phenomena can be understood in terms of three natures (svabhāva) and 
three forms of naturelessness (niḥsvabhāvatā). The three natures are the fabricated or 
constructed nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), the dependent nature (paratantra-
svabhāva), and the perfected or consummate nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). This  
paper will examine internalist and non-dualist (or anti-internalist) interpretations of 
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The Yogācāra theory of the three natures of experience. The primary form of 
interpretation here is philosophical. That is, my main concern is with the rational 
reconstruction of certain central Yogācāra philosophical commitments. The internalist 
interpretation is based on a representationalist 1  theory of experience wherein the 
contents of experience are logically independent of their cause and various 
interconnected cognitive processes continually create an integrated internal world-
model that is transparent to the cognitive system that creates and uses it. In contrast, 
the anti-internalist interpretation begins, not from the constructed nature of 
experiential objects, but from the perfected nature of mind-world non-duality. This 
interpretation treats the distinctions between inside and outside, subject and object, 
mind and world as distinctions drawn within experience rather than between 
experience and something else. And experience here refers to the continuous dynamic 
interplay of factors constituting our sentient embodied (nāma-rūpa) existence. Having 
examined each interpretation, I will suggest some reasons to favor the non-dualist 
view. 
 
2. THE THREE NATURES OF PHENOMENA 
 
In the opening verses of Treatise on the Three Natures Vasubandhu explains: 
 
1. Fabricated, dependent and perfected: So the wise understand, in depth, the three 
natures. 
 
2. What appears is the dependent [paratantra]. How it appears is the fabricated 
[parikalpita]. Because of being dependent on conditions. Because of being only 
fabrication. 
 
3. The eternal non-existence of the appearance as it appears: That is known to be the 
perfected nature [pariniṣpanna-svabhāva], because of being always the same. 
 
4. What appears there? The unreal fabrication. How does it appear? As a dual self. 
What is its nonexistence? That by which the nondual reality is there. (Gold 2014, 
244) 
 
 ‘The fabricated’ (parikalpita) here connotes mental construction and to say that 
an experiential object has a fabricated or constructed nature in this sense is to point to 
the way in which the object qua experienced depends on the constructive activities of 
mental processes. It is a core claim of the Yogācāra approach that objects of 
experience can only appear through the constructive activity of cognition and that this 
activity makes an essential contribution to how the empirical object is given. Thus, to 
say that an object is mentally constructed is not to say that it is a mere hallucination, 
since any object of experience is constructed in this way. Yet, the fabricated nature is 
                                                
1 The term ‘representationalism’ is ambiguous in contemporary philosophy. Here I am using it in the 
older, broadly Lockean sense, associated with, for instance, indirect realist views of perception.  
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inherently misleading in that, in normal experience, we do not experience objects as 
mentally constructed. Rather, our default mode is a form of naïve realism that takes 
the mind to present objects as they really are independently of the contribution of the 
mind. This leads to the paratantra-svabhāva, the dependent nature of phenomena. 
Despite the fact we tend to experience objects as experience-independent, on the 
Yogācāra account, they depend on constructive mental activity. The rainbow qua 
experiential object depends on the sensory-cognitive systems of perceivers like us. 
Since the object as a construct is not pre-given in its conditions, our deep sense that 
cognition is the simple mirroring or recovery of pre-given objects of experience is 
mistaken. The deeper truth, on this analysis, is the absence of the constructed nature 
from the dependent nature. Finally, the pariniṣpanna-svabhāva, the perfected nature, 
is the true or undistorted nature of phenomena. This is understood in terms of how an 
enlightened being would experience phenomena, namely, as the dependent nature 
absent the distortions inherent in the constructed nature, most fundamentally the 
subject-object dichotomy.   
 Minimally, on the Yogācāra analysis, we start out as naïve realists about the 
experienced world (including our own subjectivity), but through careful analysis we 
can come to see clearly the ways in which our experience of the world and ourselves 
is dependent on our own mental processes. But the Yogācārins go further. As 
Vasubandhu boldly asserts in the Viṃśatikā or Twenty Verses, “Everything in the 
three realms is only appearance.”2 ‘The three realms’ here refers to the worlds or 
states of being into which sentient beings are born. Thus the shared phenomenal 
worlds of sentient beings are appearance-only (vijñāpti-mātra). And this means, 
Vasubandhu makes clear in his auto-commentary, that the three realms are nothing 
but citta and caitta (mental processes and their variegated qualities or factors) and 
there are no mind-independent objects (artha). In so far as reality can be positively 
characterized at all, it is cittamātra, mentality-only or experience-only.3 Experiential 
objects, then, are immanent to experience, despite appearing as independent of 
experience. The fabricated appearance of independent subjects and objects is a 
distortion of the non-dual flow of experience. As he puts in the Triṁśikā (Thirty 
Verses), “The metaphors of self and external phenomena, functioning in various 
ways, take place in the transformation of consciousness.”4 And in Trisvabhāvanirdeśa 
5, he writes, “What is this unreal fabrication? Mind. For it does not exist at all in the 
way it is fabricated or in the way it fabricates a thing” (Gold 2014, 244). Indeed, 
Vasubandhu famously likens the distortion to a persistent perceptual illusion—the 
appearance of hairs in the visual field of one with an eye disease. This commitment to 
the radical primacy of experience is also found in William James’ radical empiricism. 
As James puts it in “Does Consciousness Exist?”:  
 
                                                
2 traidhātukam vijnaptimātram vyavasthāpyate. 
3 I use ‘experience’ or ‘mentality’ for citta because I think, for the Yogācārins, the term covers a far 
broader range of phenomena than our term ‘consciousness’.   
4 ātmadharmopacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate vijñānapariṇāme’ sau (1a-c).   
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As ‘subjective’ we say that the experience represents; as ‘objective’ it is represented. 
What represents and what is represented is here numerically the same; but we must 
remember that no dualism of being represented and representing resides in the 
experience per se. In its pure state, or when isolated, there is no self-splitting of it 
into consciousness and what the consciousness is 'of.' Its subjectivity and objectivity 
are functional attributes solely, realized only when the experience is ‘taken,’ i.e., 
talked-of, twice, . . .The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the 
‘pure’ experience. It is only virtually or potentially either object or subject as yet. For 
the time being, it is plain, unqualified actuality, or existence, a simple that. (James 
1976, 13) 
 
In what follows, I will take for granted the Yogācāra commitment to the primacy of 
experience, while examining internalist and anti-internalist interpretations of it.  
 
3. THE INTERNALIST-REPRESENTATIONALIST VIEW   
 
One way to flesh out the Yogācāra view is in the direction of an internalist-
representationalist account of mind. This account fits well the historical and 
conceptual connections between Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra and the indirect-realist and 
representationalist views propounded in the Sautrāntika school. It also makes good 
sense of some of Vasubandhu’s arguments against naïve and direct realist accounts of 
the mind. Another way to flesh out the model of the three natures is in the direction of 
a more radically non-dualist account of experience. This account makes good sense of 
Vasubandhu’s emphasis on overcoming subject-object duality and on the flow of 
experience as fundamental.  
 The internalist-representationalist interpretation is based on a representational 
theory of experience wherein the contents of experience are logically independent of 
their cause. So, in the familiar fashion, an experience can be a visual presentation as 
of a shiny red apple, whether that experience is a dream, a hallucination, or a veridical 
perceptual experience. Indeed, what we are directly aware of in experience are not 
external objects, but mental images or representations (ākāra), which can be caused 
in a variety of ways. Dreaming and perception alike involve the phenomenal 
presentation of experiential objects, but differ in their causal constraints. As 
Vasubandhu argues in the Viṃśatikā, those general features of waking experience that 
the realist attributes to interaction with experience-independent objects can also be 
found in dreams, which both parties admit do not involve the apprehension of 
independent objects. 
  
Restriction as to place, etc. is demonstrated as in a dream. (3a) Now how is this? In a 
dream, even without an (external) object of sense or understanding, only certain things 
are to be seen: bees, gardens, women, men, etc. and these only in certain places, and not 
everywhere. And even there in those places, they are to be seen only sometimes, and not 
all the time. In this way, even without an (external) object of sense or understanding, 
there may be restriction as to place and time (Anacker 1998, 162). 
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 Moreover, the character of a representation derives from the capacities and 
conditioning of the mind that creates it. Thus, depending on the differences in their 
karmic conditioning, one being will experience crystal clear water, while another 
experiences a river of pus. “For all the pretas who are in a similar situation due to a 
similar retribution for action, and not just one of them, see a river filled with pus” 
(Anacker 1998: 162). This extreme difference in experiential contents is not 
explained by appeal to independently existing objects.  
 The stream of consciousness, then, is a causal process whereby virtual worlds of 
experience are brought forth moment by moment. The citta-saṃtāna is in the 
business of dreaming up worlds of experience, whether we are asleep or awake. Yet, 
we are by default naïve realists about the virtual worlds our minds create. We do not 
recognize our mental constructs as mental constructs, but take them to be mind-
independent external objects. Thus the fabricated nature here refers to the mentally 
constructed objects within the virtual world of experience. The dependent nature 
refers to the fact that, despite appearances, experiential objects are mind-dependent 
(both causally and constitutively). The dependent nature by extension also refers to 
those causal processes by which mental objects are constructed. Recognition of the 
absence of the constructed nature from the other dependent nature amounts to a 
recognition that the direct objects of experience are merely mental constructs or 
representations (vijñāptimātra) that continuously emerge from causal processes that 
we are not directly aware of. Seeing through to the true nature of experience, finally, 
is to experience the perfected nature.  
 On the Yogācāra account, this recognition of the true nature of experience is not a 
merely intellectual understanding, but rather a transformation at the very basis of 
experience (āśraya-parāvṛtti). In the normal case our mental representations are 
transparent—we do not see them as representations at all. As Thomas Metzinger 
writes, “a representation is transparent if the system using it cannot recognize it as a 
representation. A world-model active in the brain is transparent if the brain has no 
chance of discovering that it is a model” (Metzinger 2010, 41). He goes on to say that 
our various mental representations are, 
 
seamlessly integrated into your overall conscious space of experience. Because it has 
been optimized over millions of years, this mechanism is so fast and so reliable that you 
never notice its existence. It makes your brain invisible to itself. You are in contact only 
with its content; you never see the representation as such; therefore, you have the illusion 
of being directly in contact with the world. And that is how you become a naïve realist, a 
person who thinks she is in touch with an observer-independent reality. (Metzinger 2010, 
43) 
 
On the internalist-representationalist interpretation of the three natures, various 
interconnected cognitive processes continually create an integrated internal world-
model that is transparent to the cognitive system that creates and uses it. Note, 
though, that Metzinger’s account of transparency is stronger than Vasubandhu’s, 
since Metzinger asserts that the system itself cannot recognize its transparent 
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representations as representations. Vasubandhu, however, holds that our 
representations are in the normal case strictly transparent, but that this can change 
through the development of philosophical and meditative insight.  
  There are two interesting types of case that lend support to Vasubandhu’s 
position. The first type of case concerns persistent auditory hallucinations. People 
who suffer from persistent musical hallucinations often report that the music is 
experienced as if it were like any other music playing in their environment. It can be 
experienced as loud or quiet, as nearby or far away, as clear or muffled, and so on. 
While some people quickly realize that they are experiencing hallucinations, others 
remain for extended periods under the impression that their auditory experience is 
veridical. According to Paul Coates (2013), the transition process follows three 
stages. In the ‘deceptive phase’, the music is experienced as externally produced, 
spatially located, and public. Here the auditory experience is constructed as an 
external sound event. Eventually, in the ‘transition phase’ the subject realizes that the 
auditory experience does not correspond to bodily movements in the right way 
(moving toward or away from the apparent location of the sound does not change its 
sensory character) or that others can’t hear it, etc. In the final ‘realization phase’, the 
subject has come to fully recognize the hallucination as a hallucination. What this 
involves, according to Coates, is a shift in the way the auditory phenomenon is 
automatically conceptualized. So, while the subject can still describe the various 
phenomenal features of the auditory phenomena (volume, pitch, timbre, etc.), she no 
longer takes it to be an objective sound event. It is important to see that, on Coates’ 
view, this is not a merely intellectual change. Rather, because our experience involves 
an integration of sensory and cognitive aspects, a change in how a sensory 
phenomenon is automatically conceptualized is a change in the overall phenomenal 
character of the experience. What was transparently experienced as an objective event 
is now experienced as an internal merely subjective event. Hence, the auditory 
representation is no longer transparent in Metzinger’s sense. 
 The second type of case is lucid dreaming. In cases of lucid dreaming, subjects 
are dreaming, but are aware that they are dreaming and also possess memory of both 
waking life and dream life, as well as the experience of attentional, thinking, and 
behavioral agency (Metzinger 2010). The lucid dreamer recognizes the dream world 
as a dream world and therefore recognizes the virtual world of experience as virtual. 
This type of global recognition of the mind-dependent character of the dream world 
can also carry over into waking life such that waking is also experienced as dream-
like. On the internalist-representationalist interpretation of Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra—
and following an analogy used in the tradition itself—the transformation at the basis 
(āśrayaparāvṛtti) is similar to the global recognition found in lucid dreaming.  To 
realize the consummate nature is to have not just lucid dreaming, but lucid 
experiencing as such. 
 Now despite the perhaps unfamiliar language, much of this should be fairly 
familiar. What we are directly aware of in conscious experience are not observer-
independent features of the external world, but mental images caused by the 
interaction between a broader causal nexus and our cognitive system. We are usually 
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unaware of both the constructive activity of the mind in producing these images and 
we are unaware that they are images, rather than external objects. The mind 
constructs a virtual world-model that is transparent to us. But Vasubandhu’s view is 
more radical than many other internalist-representationalist views of the mind in that 
he applies the model of the three natures to the subject of experience as well. For him, 
the fundamental structure of the parikalpita-svabhāva is the subject-object framework 
itself. Like the observed objects, the observing self is a virtual construct (kalpita-
ātmanā) of a cognitive system. Indeed, Vasubandhu will agree with the Nyāya (and 
Kantian) point that there is a deep interdependence between grasping an objective 
world and grasping oneself as a persisting subject of experience. It’s just that, on his 
view, this goes to show that both are distorted mental fabrications, appearance-only. 
On the Yogācāra view, the sense of self arises from the way the cognitive system 
models itself and draws the self-other distinction. This is the kliṣṭa-manas (afflictive 
mentation), which mistakes the selfless flow of the ālayavijñāna (base consciousness) 
for a persisting self. It is also the basis for the general sense of mental ownership and 
for thinking self-referential thoughts involving ‘I’, ‘me’, and ‘mine’ (and their 
contrasts). Yet, for Vasubandhu, there is no such entity as a self, only the self-model 
of an impermanent cognitive system. What we take to be the self is like an avatar in 
the virtual world created by the mind. Again, the similarity to Metzinger is 
instructive: 
 
The brain is like a total flight simulator, a self-modeling airplane that, rather than being 
flown by a pilot, generates a complex internal image of itself within its own internal 
flight simulator. The image is transparent and thus cannot be recognized as an image by 
the system. Operating under the condition of a naive-realistic self-misunderstanding, the 
system interprets the control element in this image as a nonphysical object: The “pilot” is 
born into a virtual reality with no opportunity to discover this fact. The pilot is the Ego. 
(Metzinger 2010, 108) 
 
Of course, Vasubandhu takes the basis of the simulation to be the ālayavijñāna, not 
the brain (and he is, to put it mildly, much less sanguine about the idea that the 
ultimate causal basis of experience is an observer-independent physical reality). 
Moreover, as we have seen, he thinks it is possible to come to see both the 
experiential world and the experiential self as vijñāptimātra. The result is said to be a 
radical transcendence of the subject-object framework of understanding experience. 
 This internalist-representationalist approach to Yogācāra, taken to its logical 
conclusion, finds expression in later Buddhist epistemologists like Ratnakīrti. The 
reduction of subject and object to mere virtual images internal to a moment of 
consciousness, coupled with Buddhist nominalism and mereological reductionism, 
pushes later thinkers to embrace (what has been called) solipsistic idealism. 
Prajñākaragupta, for instance, gives a bracing summary of this radical view: 
 
There is neither an ‘I’ nor a ‘he’ nor a ‘you’ nor even an ‘it’; neither the thing, nor the 
not-thing; neither a law nor a system; neither the terms nor the relations. But there are 
only the cognitive events of colourless sensations which have forms but no names. They 
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are caught for a moment in a stream and then rush to naught. Even the stream is a fiction. 
That sensum of the moment, the purest particular, that advaya, the indivisible unit of 
cognition, that is the sole reality, the rest are all fictions, stirred up by time-honoured 
convention of language which is itself a grand fiction. (Ganguli 1963, 193)   
 
4. THE NON-DUALIST VIEW 
 
While the above internalist-representationalist interpretation of the doctrine of three 
natures is a coherent and plausible one, I would now like to turn to a quite different, 
anti-internalist or non-dualist interpretation of the trisvabhāva view. On this ‘non-
dualist’ interpretation, we start, not from the constructed nature of experiential 
objects, but from the perfected nature of mind-world non-duality. In this regard, 
Japanese philosopher Nishitani Keiji relates an interesting story from the Zen 
tradition: 
 
On a pilgrimage seeking the Way with two companion monks, Hōgen stopped to rest at 
the temple of a Zen priest named Jizō (Dicang) one rainy day. When the rain cleared and 
they were about to set off again, Jizō, who had come to see them off, remarked, “It is said 
you usually expound the doctrine that the three worlds are mind only.” Then, pointing to 
a rock in the garden, he asked, “Is that rock inside your mind or outside it?” “Inside my 
mind, of course,” was the answer Hōgen gave, typical of consciousness-only theory. Jizō 
immediately retorted, “By what karmic fate I do not know, but a man is wandering 
around with a lump of stone in his mind. He must feel quite heavy.” (Nishitani 2009, 
101) 
 
Jizō’s point here, I take it, is not to reinstate a naively realistic view of experience, but 
rather to challenge Hōgen’s phenomenologically and ontologically internalist view of 
Yogācāra. That is, the attempt to overcome the subject-object dichotomy by simply 
internalizing the phenomenal world—whereby the experienced rock is supposed to be 
in Hōgen’s mind, which is implicitly in his head—is insufficiently radical. It tries to 
overcome the dichotomy by treating the mind as self-contained and therefore it does 
not transcend the subject-object or inside-outside duality, but rather absolutizes one 
side of it. Instead of the thoroughgoing interdependence of mind and world, the 
internalist-representationalist account of the three natures treats the mind as an 
autonomously intelligible domain. Indeed, it is precisely the tendency to treat the 
mind as being self-contained and ontologically fundamental (call it the myth of the 
‘ready-made mind’) that is at the basis of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka critique of 
Yogācāra. 
 The key to the anti-internalist interpretation is to see that Yogācāra constitutes a 
radical critique and revision of the notion of mentality or experience. Given our 
deeply entrenched realist and objectivist assumptions, it is hard to resist the idea that, 
in claiming that the phenomenal world is vijñāptimātra, the Yogācārins are positing 
experience as veil of appearances between subject and world. But this is to confuse 
the parikalpita with the paratantra—that is, it conflates the fabricated distortion of 
experience with the real nature of experience itself. Experience (vijñāna) as 
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paratantra is neither a medium nor a partition between the subjective and objective 
realms. It is the dynamic causal process out of which subjects and objects emerge. 
And since there is no subject apart from this more basic causal-experiential process, 
the process itself cannot serve as a medium or a veil between a subject and its world.  
 The non-dualist alternative, then, is to treat the distinctions between inside and 
outside, subject and object, mind and world as distinctions drawn within experience 
rather than between experience and something else. And experience here refers to the 
continuous dynamic interplay of (what we label) ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ factors 
constituting our sentient embodied (nāma-rūpa) being-in-the-world. This radical view 
is, I think, prefigured even in the early Buddhist tradition. In the Dīgha Nikāya we 
find: 
 
just this, namely nāma-rūpa, is the cause, ground, origin and condition of consciousness. 
Thus far, then, can we trace birth and decay, death and passing away and being reborn, 
thus far extends the way of designation (adhivacana), of language (nirutti), of concepts 
(paññatti), thus far is the sphere of understanding (paññāvacara), thus far the round (of 
rebirth) goes as far as can be discerned here, namely nāma-rūpa together with 
consciousness. (Walshe 1995, 224)  
 
In Yogācāra, we find a radically experientialist revision of this early Buddhist view.  
The nāma-rūpa process is now seen as a causal-experiential process by which 
karmically recursive streams of experience—including bodily experience—give rise 
to the appearance of subjects-in-worlds. So, rather than holding fixed the internalist-
subjectivist view of mentality and simply internalizing the phenomenal world, it 
would be more accurate to say that Yogācāra radically externalizes the notion of 
experience. The causal-experiential process of paratantra is now co-extensive with 
the causal nexus of dependent arising.  
 Thus, as I pointed out above, the anti-internalist interpretation has affinities to 
radical empiricism. In both radical empiricism and Yogācāra, experience is 
understood transactionally. As John Dewey writes: 
 
The structure of whatever is had by way of immediate qualitative presences is found in 
the recurrent modes of interaction taking place between what we term organism, on one 
side, and environment, on the other. This interaction is the primary fact, and it constitutes 
a trans-action. Only by analysis and selective abstraction can we differentiate the actual 
occurrence into two factors, one called organism and the other, environment. (Dewey 
1984 v.5, 220) 
 
On this non-dualist interpretation of the three natures, the paratantra-svabhāva is the 
transactional flow of lived experience itself. From this flow we can construct (and 
reconstruct) the various distinctions between mind and world, subject and object, or 
inside and outside, but these categories should not be thought of as metaphysically 
prior to experience. As Dewey and Arthur Bentley further characterize the 
transactional approach: 
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systems of descriptions and naming are employed to deal with aspects and phases of 
action, without final attribution to “elements” or other presumptively detachable or 
independent “entities,” “essences,” or “realities,” and without isolation of presumptively 
detachable “relations” from such detachable "elements" (Dewey and Bentley 1989,108). 
 
Furthermore, the construction of experiential objects and subjects is misleading in 
that we take the constructs to be prior to and independent of the experiential process 
itself. This does not mean that experiential objects are ‘inside us’, rather than ‘out 
there’ in the world where they appear to be. Rather, the point is that the very contrast 
between inside and outside emerges from and only makes sense within lived 
experience itself. Finally, the direct realization that there is no ‘sideways-on’ view of 
the open-ended domain of experience and therefore no absolute dualities within it is 
the realization of the perfected nature. 
 Furthermore, even at the level of the fabricated nature, there are reasons to 
question the strictly internalist-representationalist interpretation. Again, the basic 
problem with the internalist interpretation is that it preserves the idea of mentality as a 
self-contained, private, subjective domain and then tries to internalize the world—the 
phenomenal world becomes the content of a private internal world-model. This raises 
the specter of solipsism in that the same argumentative strategies used to undermine 
belief in an external world of objects independent of one’s own mind can be used to 
undermine belief in other minds as well. This challenge was well known to later 
Yogācārins, such as Dharmakīrti, who attempted to show that Buddhist idealism does 
not entail solipsism (Henkel 2012). Yet, the internalist approach does not fully 
appreciate the radical decentering of the subjective, first-person point of view in 
Yogācāra. As Sthiramati tells us in the Madhyāntvibhāgaṭīkā, “Subjectivity 
(grāhakatvam) is not possible if no object (grāhya) exists.” And, “Since there is no 
object in the absence of a subject, it is not possible for there to be a subject when 
there is no object” (Shaw 1987, 233). Within the parikalpita (or experience as 
abhūtaparikalpita) subjectivity and objectivity are mutually specifying, and so 
mentality cannot be understood as an autonomous, private domain. Subjectivity and 
objectivity are interdependent fabrications of the process of experience, and therefore 
the subject is always a subject-in-a-world. So, while Vasubandhu’s appeal to dreams 
may point to the phenomenological and explanatory robustness of the experiential 
process, it is his appeal to ghosts (pretas) and hell-realms that is most important to the 
anti-internalist interpretation.  
 According to the Buddhist cosmology Vasubandhu is drawing on in the 
Viṃśatikā, humans and pretas share a world, a bhājana-loka or ‘receptacle world’. 
They share an apparent physical locus and both perceive a river in the same place. 
However, as mentioned earlier, humans see clear water while pretas see pus. In 
contrast, hell-beings exist in a realm that is spatially distinct from the human realm, 
where they experience torture at the hands of demons. However, the demons are not 
independent beings in their own right, but rather collective projections of the negative 
karma of the poor beings in hell. The key point here, though, is that interacting 
causal-experiential streams co-create shared intersubjective worlds. And these shared 
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worlds provide the context for on-going karmic activity, which in turn shapes the 
subjectivity of beings within these worlds. Hence, while dream experience may be 
understood as the imaginative play of an individual mind-stream, waking experience 
is understood as the intersubjective co-creation of shared (or overlapping) 
phenomenal worlds. On this account, the first-person perspective of the subject is not 
the privileged basis of experiential construction, but simply one more fabricated 
aspect of it. And individual subjectivity cannot be understood apart from 
intersubjectivity and shared phenomenal worlds.  
 Finally, it is important to appreciate the central role of conceptual-linguistic 
construction in the Yogācāra view. The construction of shared worlds of experience 
relies on the operations of various conceptual and linguistic imprints or 
predispositions: conceptual imprints (vikalpavāsanā), linguistic imprints 
(abhilāpavāsanā), and discursive imprints (prapañcavāsanā). These vāsanās are 
critical to the construction of shared worlds (bhājana-loka) and are themselves 
intersubjective. As we see in early Yogācāra, the ālayavijñāna has both individual 
(asādhāraṇa) and shared or common (sādhāraṇa) dimensions, and the conceptual 
and linguistic predispositions are directly associated with the common dimension. For 
the Yogācārins, to a large degree we share a common life-world because we share 
(mostly sub-personal) conceptual and linguistic schemas. This stated clearly in the 
Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra: 
 
The mind with all the seeds (ālayavijñāna) matures, congeals, grows, develops, and 
increases based upon . . . the substratum of the material sense-faculties along with their 
supports and the substratum which consists of the predispositions toward conceptual 
proliferation in terms of conventional usage of images, names, and conceptualizations. 
(Waldron 2003, 95)  
 
The individual aspect of base consciousness is largely grounded in our sensory 
faculties, while the shared aspect is largely grounded in our conceptual-linguistic 
schemes. Furthermore, these cognitive predispositions suffuse (or ‘perfume’) our 
experience and play a central role in the fabrication of our subjectivity. Thus, it isn’t 
just our shared world that is intersubjectively constructed, human subjectivity, on this 
account, is also conceptually and linguistically constructed.  
 Returning to Coates’ three phases of recognizing a hallucination, on the non-
dualist view, the deceptive phase is just naïve realism about lived experience. We 
experience ourselves as isolated Cartesian subjects confronting other Cartesian 
subjects within a fully independent objective world. In the transition stage, we come 
to deeper understanding of the constructing and constructed nature of experience. 
This leads to the realization stage, a recognition that subjectivity, intersubjectivity, 
and objectivity are thoroughly interdependent co-constructions of causal-experiential 
processes that are both beneath and beyond subject and object. Reality, in so far as it 
can be positively characterized at all, is seen—to borrow a phrase from Timothy 
Sprigge (2006, 484)—as “a vast system of interacting streams of experience,” beyond 
all duality.    
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 The non-dualist view of the three natures sketched here is similar to what 
Anthony Rudd (2003) calls Kantian or non-realist externalism, which he attributes 
also to Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. “On the [realist] externalist 
views,” he writes, “the mind is not self-contained; the non-realist externalist will 
agree with that, but will add that the world is not self-contained either” (Rudd 2003, 
49). In the context of the Yogācāra dialectic, we may rephrase this as, “the world (or 
experiential objects) is not self-contained, but the mind is not self-contained either.” 
Mind and world are constitutively bound together and there is no point of view 
completely outside this interdependence. What come to be labeled as ‘mind’ and 
‘world’ are momentary constructions carved out of the dynamic, interdependent flow 
of the paratantra. As Sthiramati puts it, “Indeed, consciousness takes on the 
appearance of manifold images, in the form of all sorts of independent things, like the 
eyes in the tail of a peacock... (but) the independent elements (dharmasvabāvaḥ) ... 
are merely illusion (bhrāntimātra)” (Shaw 1987, 233). 
 But, one might object in Candrakīrtian fashion, if we cannot step outside of lived 
experience and it is that from which ‘subject’ and ‘object’, etc. emerge, then hasn’t 
experience itself been absolutized? In a sense, this is what we find in Ratnakīrti’s 
Saṃtānāntara-dūṣaṇa (Refutation of Other Mindstreams): 
 
If the mind of another person is possibly existent, then our own mind would be 
differentiated from that; otherwise what is admitted as another mind would not be distinct 
from our own mind which is being manifested. But we do not actually discern the 
difference between the two. Thus, it follows that another person's mind, which is 
excluded neither from what is different from our own mind, nor from what is identical 
with it, is simply non-existent as a universal (sāmānya) or a rabbit's horn. (Kajiyama 
1965, 425-426) 
 
In Ratnakīrti’s Yogācāra, while one may differentiate one’s own mind from others at 
the conventional level, at the ultimate level there is no real boundary (avadhi) 
between streams of experience (Perrett 2017). There is only non-individuated, 
absolute mind or consciousness.  
 However, the anti-internalist Yogācārin, in response to the Candrakīrtian 
objection, could say that ‘experience’ (citta-caitta) itself should be treated as a 
transactional (vyavahāra) notion not an absolute one. Vasubandhu and his fellow 
Yogācārins, on my interpretation, agree with the more general Mahāyāna view that 
reality as such (dharmatā) is inexpressible, a “thusness” (tathatā) that cannot be 
captured by any conceptual framework, including the conceptual framework of 
cittamātra. At the conventional level, the causal-experiential process has a kind of 
primacy insofar as it is the always-presupposed background of our more particular 
practices of understanding and explanation. But precisely insofar as it plays its role as 
background, it cannot also serve as an epistemic or absolute ontological foundation—
though perhaps some Yogācārins wanted it to do so. It seems to me that to try to 
employ experience foundationally, though, would be to try to objectify that which 
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makes possible and thus always recedes from objectification. In this sense, experience 
is both inescapable and ultimately ungraspable. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that the internalist-representationalist account fits the historical and 
conceptual connections between Yogācāra and the indirect-realist and 
representationalist views propounded in the Sautrāntika school. Additionally, it 
makes sense of some of the key epistemological arguments against naïve and direct 
realist accounts of the mind and world. However, the internalist interpretation is 
weaker concerning Yogācāra accounts of the intersubjective co-creating of the 
phenomenal world, and their radical critique of subject-object duality. Furthermore, 
as a philosophical matter, the internalist view threatens to collapse into solipsism. 
While the threat of solipsism is not itself a decisive reason to reject the internalist 
interpretation, considerations of charity in philosophical reconstruction make it 
reasonable to look for alternative interpretations, especially since major Yogācāra 
thinkers like Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti explicitly reject solipsism.  
 I have further argued that the non-dualist interpretation better accommodates the 
deep intersubjectivity of phenomenal worlds, the individual and shared aspects of the 
ālayavijñāna, and the radical non-duality of subject and object in Yogācāra. 
Admittedly, the non-dualist interpretation implies a greater conceptual distance 
between Yogācāra and Sautrāntika, which may be thought a weakness of the 
interpretation. Yet, the non-dual interpretation does highlight important continuities 
between Yogācāra and later East Asian forms of Buddhism, such as Zen (Nishitani 
2009). Furthermore, the non-dualist interpretation, I think, provides a better answer to 
the question of solipsism and shows why Yogācāra idealism is fundamentally 
different from simple subjective idealism. Where subjective idealism merely 
internalizes the objective, reducing it to the subjective, Yogācāra idealism offers a 
radical critique of both objectivity and subjectivity. Conventionally, subject and 
object, grasper and grasped are thoroughly interdependent. Ultimately, there is neither 
subject nor object, but only the flow of non-dual awareness—though even here we 
must remember that, for the Yogācārin, constructions like ‘the flow of non-dual 
awareness’ are only provisional pointers to what is ultimately inexpressible. In the 
end, if the non-dualist interpretation makes apparent that Yogācāra is neither 
solipsism nor subjective idealism, I take that to be a good reason to prefer it over the 
internalist interpretation. 
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